In China-led world, where would India fit in

KN Raghavan

Is the world order designed by the US, which has been in existence since the end of World War ll, in danger of being replaced by a new dispensation led by China? If so, what would be the essential features of this Beijing-led system? How would India be impacted by the changes brought on account of the newfound determination of China to lead the world?

These questions are discussed in depth in the book Pax Sinica: Implications for the Indian Dawn, penned by Samir Saran and Akhil Deo. The book traces the ascension of Xi Jinping to a position of absolute authority in Beijing, overturning the cardinal principles of collective leadership and fixed tenure for higher functionaries, laid down by Deng Xiaoping. Xi’s determination to pursue an aggressive policy to help China gain her rightful place at the high table of international diplomacy, while at the same time emerging as the unchallenged leader of his nation, forms the crux of this book.

To Xi’s advantage, this period also coincided with the presidency of Donald Trump, who chose to reverse the US policy of closer involvement in the affairs of Asia that his predecessor Barack Obama had initiated. The success attained in pursuing an assertive approach in the dispute over ownership of islands in South China Sea emboldened Beijing to show scant regard towards the decision of international tribunal. The strategy of setting up organisations like AIIB and NDB, which poses a direct challenge to Bretton Woods institutions, clicked, as did the game plan of using investments in countries to break up the cohesion of established international blocs to its advantage. The authors have examined these developments in detail.

As expected, the much-publicised Belt Road Initiative (BRI), which is touted as the dream project of Xi, gets the maximum attention. The authors have examined various facets of this mammoth undertaking and the advantages that China seeks to leverage from the huge investment this would entail. The implications for India, especially in the context of reservations raised by Delhi, have been subjected to close scrutiny. Similarly, the measures taken by China to befriend countries in South Asia through investments to plug the infrastructure gap and the manner in which these nations have attempted to “hedge their bets” between Delhi and Beijing make for interesting reading.

China’s attempts to garner influence in this region have raised huge concerns for India, which has traditionally considered islands in Indian Ocean as falling under its zone of influence, both due to geographical factors as well as civilisational ties. However, India faces limitations in matching Chinese munificence and can only point out the dangers involved in accepting investments which come with many strings attached. India’s resolute measures to assist Bhutan in checkmating China’s attempt to station forces in Doklam plateau stand in stark contrast with the meek manner in which countries in East Asia succumbed to the belligerence exhibited by Beijing in South China Sea.

According to the authors, the world order that Xi seeks to usher in would have the leadership of the Communist Party of China as its centrepiece. However, this presents too small a canvas for laying down the essentials of a system that can replace the present one, which, for the most part, represents a continuum of the principles embodied in Pax Britannica, that was in existence for almost two centuries. Further, it is too early to predict whether the US would surrender the preeminence in the conduct of international trade. The trade war that Trump has set in motion, which has hurt China, indicates that the US would not be prepared to yield space easily.

One aspect that the authors have failed to examine deeply is the role that India could play in East and South East Asia, particularly with respect to improving ties with nations that constitute ASEAN. The brazen measures taken by Beijing to establish Chinese hegemony in this part of the world have prompted the countries located here to look at India as a bulwark they could rely on. But India has been rather slovenly in its efforts to strengthen links with these countries. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) offered India an opportunity to make inroads into this region, which was not utilised. The reports that have emanated in certain sections of the media about Japan pulling out of RCEP if India is not a signatory is required to be seen from this perspective.

Similarly, there is no discussion about the challenges that Xi could face from within China, particularly from the provinces of Xinjiang, where it is reported that almost a million Muslims are kept in detention camps, euphemistically referred to as Vocational Training and Education Centres, and Tibet, where an uneasy quiet prevails at present. If the events presently happening at Hong Kong are any indication, Xi cannot afford to take the populace for granted, though currently his popularity remains high. He would know that no amount of force or censorship or even jamming of networks would help if disgruntlement of masses against a regime gains critical momentum.

There appears to be one factual error where the authors state that Doklam plateau had witnessed heavy clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in 1967. The official version states the exchange of fire was limited to Nathu La and Chok La region in the Sikkim sector. This apart, the book is well researched, as befitting the status of authors, who are part of a leading think tank on international relations and strategic thinking. Overall, the book is a good read and presents in simple language the nuances and objectives that govern China’s foreign policy and the portents it holds for India.