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India can defuse tensions

New Delhi is uniquely placed to bring US and Iran to the negotiating table

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MK Bhadrakumar

M K Bhadrakumar 
Former ambassador

The four-day visit to India last week by Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has the markings of a significant diplomatic event. For a start, the India-Iran bilateral relations seem to regain some of their lost verve. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Tehran in end-December has proved to be a turning point. India’s interest in resuming the work on the Chabahar Port project and developing India’s regional connectivity via Iran has bestirred the moribund economic relationship.

The mutual confidence and goodwill is evident in the decision taken last week during Zarif’s call on Jaishankar to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the bilateral Treaty of Friendship in 2020. India’s openness to resuscitating the barter system in trade and the plans to open a branch of Bank Pasargad in India are indicative of the interest to walk out of a time warp imposed by the US.

PM Modi made a significant gesture by receiving Zarif, which in itself carried a great deal of geopolitical symbolism at the present tumultuous phase of the situation around Iran. The PMO’s readout said, ‘The foreign minister shared his perspectives on the recent developments in the region. The Prime Minister mentioned India’s strong interest in peace, security and stability in the region.’

The MEA press note on Zarif’s discussion at a breakfast meeting with Jaishankar suggests that the discussions with the PM the previous day were carried forward. It says, ‘The two sides also exchanged views on regional and global issues of mutual interest, including the recent developments in the West Asia region and the joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA). EAM reiterated Indian interests in the region and support for efforts to maintain peace, security and stability in the region.’ These important exchanges can also be read in the context of the Indian statement describing the Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed at the express orders of President Trump, as ‘a senior Iranian leader’, which was tantamount to a calibrated distancing from the US narrative.

It stands to reason that the Indian leadership underscored the importance that is attached to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region where India has high stakes. Without doubt, a new criticality will be appearing in the next two months in the regional situation. The future of the JCPOA (2015 Iran N-deal) is at stake, with the E-3 (UK, France and Germany) alleging that Iran is not complying with the commitments under the agreement and referring the matter to the so-called Dispute Resolution Mechanism.

They have demanded that Iran must unilaterally abide by the commitments under the JCPOA, failing which ‘we would have no option but to take action’. Plainly put, the E-3 has implicitly triggered a process to notify the UN Security Council seeking a vote to reimpose the sanctions in all previous UN resolutions against Iran — referred to as ‘snapback’. The likelihood is that the European powers are acting in concert with the Trump administration. The Washington Post reported that the Trump administration threatened to impose 25% import duty on European cars unless they forthwith dumped the JCPOA and reimposed the sanctions against Iran.

Last Tuesday, UK PM Boris Johnson all but openly acknowledged it by saying, ‘If we’re going to get rid of it (JCPOA), let’s replace it and let’s replace it with the Trump deal,’ he said. ‘President Trump is a great dealmaker, by his own account. Let’s work together to replace the JCPOA and get the Trump deal instead.’ The western assessment could be that at a time when social tensions are running high in Iran, which may exacerbate in the event of a surge in sanctions, Tehran would be susceptible to such pressure.

Once the E-3 notifies the Security Council, the body must vote within 30 days on a resolution to continue Iran’s sanctions relief. A resolution needs nine votes in favour and no vetoes are allowed. The entire dispute resolution process up to that point could take up to 65 days to play out unless extended by consensus. The JCPOA’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism is being activated formally this week. Tehran’s first reaction was one of indignation. Zarif called it ‘legally baseless and a strategic mistake from a political standpoint’. However, a foreign ministry spokesman said Iran was ‘ready to... make constructive attempts to maintain international agreements and would welcome any practical initiatives in this regard’.

Conceivably, Tehran cannot accept a ‘Trump deal’, which expects it to consent to a more restrictive agreement than the JCPOA that will also include new constraints on its missile programmes. Equally, Trump is in no mood to lift the sanctions, having convinced himself that his ‘maximum pressure’ campaign is working. However, Iran recently demonstrated its missile capability to inflict heavy loss of lives on US military personnel in the region, which would inhibit Trump from resorting to military confrontation during an election year in the US.

Arguably, in the light of the discussions with Zarif, and given the friendly ties with Iran, and taking into account India’s ‘defining partnership’ with the US, New Delhi is uniquely placed to bring the two protagonists to the negotiating table. None of the third countries that tried a hand — from Japan to Pakistan to Oman — enjoyed India’s credentials. It is a tough call, but there is everything to gain if India can play a constructive role in this dismal scenario, which will make a profound contribution to regional and international security. Fortuitously, Delhi and Washington are discussing a visit by Trump to India in the near future.

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