It wasn’t just masjid that fell

Zoya Hasan
Professor Emerita, Jawaharlal Nehru University

IT’S been 30 years since the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Torn down by a mob in full public view, the destruction of the mosque occurred on the back of a massive mobilisation that shook India’s secular foundations. This act of political defiance testifies to the mobilisational power of religious identities and symbols in shaping the growth of majority sentiment in politics and public affairs and the systematic way in which priority has been given to these interests. Any separation of religion and the state, which was always weak in India, became even weaker after this; consequently, sectarian politics has gained new adherents.

Even if Ayodhya is not an election issue today, the polarisation it engendered is more toxic than before and poses an existential threat to India’s pluralist democracy.

The Ayodhya dispute tested India’s resilience as a secular democracy. Constitutionally, it opened the prospect of changing both the ideological discourse and institutional politics in favour of a majoritarian idea of India, in contrast to the pluralist, non-parochial idea of the nation held in high regard earlier. Much of the dominance of the Hindu right in India’s politics today can be traced back to the movement to destroy the Babri Masjid and build a Ram temple where the mosque once stood in the city of Ayodhya. The systematic push for political power wouldn’t have succeeded as it has in the last 30 years without the ground prepared by the Ayodhya movement.

The Congress contributed significantly to this process by getting involved in the controversy, and that too at a time when Hindutva politics was on the rise. Even though it refrained from riding the tiger of communalism, it ended up creating a space for religious politics to play a more central role in public life. It changed the dynamics of electoral politics which undermined its own monopoly over power. The end of Congress dominance paved the way for the emergence of BJP’s brand of majoritarian politics as increasing numbers of the middle classes bought into the idea that the Hindu majority has been denied its rightful place in the public sphere.

The Ayodhya campaign was designed to produce an image of Hindus suffering at the hands of minorities, even though they formed an overwhelming majority and dominated diverse spheres of life. Nonetheless, a large section of Hindus began, consciously or subconsciously, embracing the idea of a Hindu state where centuries of suppression by Muslim invaders would now be corrected. The politics of revenge and targeting of minorities, a hallmark of many right-wing authoritarian regimes worldwide, became central to the political discourse in India too. Hindu unity was thus sought to be created not by what they share but through the common opposition to the ‘enemy within’.

The BJP replaced the Congress as the central pole of Indian politics after its spectacular victories in 2014 and 2019. The Supreme Court expedited the Ayodhya case with daily hearings and delivered its verdict in November 2019. Terming the demolition of the mosque an ‘egregious violation of the law’, the court nevertheless awarded the disputed site to the Hindu nationalist litigants.

The ruling was a huge legal and political victory for the BJP. Many had thought that victory in the Ayodhya case would settle conflicts over disputed sites and communal mobilisation will abate. But things did not stop there. This has become clear from subsequent events in the Gyanvapi case. Claims to Gyanvapi mosque in Varanasi are a reenactment of events in Ayodhya despite the existence of the Places of Worship Act (Special Provisions) 1991 which prohibits the conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, as existing on August 15, 1947. The law is hardly an impediment when powerful forces decide to rake up these disputes. As in the case of Ayodhya, this dispute is not about law, nor even history, but about pushing the majoritarian political agenda.

Beyond these developments, the verdict gave a new fillip to the ruling dispensation to pursue the remaining key elements in the larger Hindutva plan — abrogation of Article 370, removing the special status accorded to J&K; construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya; and imposition of a uniform civil code. Even as there was no prospect of punishment for those who planned and orchestrated the demolition of the masjid, the Bhumi Pujan for the Ram temple, though organised by the Ram Janmabhoomi Trust, became an official-cum-political function, with the PM laying the foundation for the temple. Merging of state, politics, and religion in the construction of the temple marked an important stage in the progress of Hindutva and its strategy of converting India into a majoritarian republic.

The Ayodhya issue had a deep impact on other political parties too. It forced a number of parties to acknowledge the primacy of the Hindu majority while putting them on the defensive vis-à-vis the promotion and protection of minority interests. Opposition parties have been wary of defending pluralism and secularism. The Congress’s Bharat Jodo Yatra is the first serious attempt to counter the majoritarian turn in politics and improve public dialogue against division and intolerance.

Ayodhya caused a profound rupture in the political realm, thus underlining the success of religious nationalism in establishing a markedly majoritarian ethos and ethnic state, enshrined in law and policy. Furthermore, it accentuated fault lines in the social realm. This has meant narrowing of democracy, rise of a stronger authoritarian system at a political level, replacement of inclusive nationalism with religious nationalism, and decline of mutual respect and tolerance. Even if Ayodhya is not an election issue today, the polarisation it engendered is more toxic than ever before, posing an existential threat to India’s pluralist democracy.