Europe in state of uncertainty over Ukraine crisis

Lt Gen Sanjiv Langer (retd)
Former Deputy Chief of Defence Staff

THE second largest country in Europe, with a population of 43.8 million, Ukraine has always aspired for independence. With rolling plains and river valleys, the land is unequally divided by the 980-km course of the Dnieper river. It is gifted with a long coastline on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Dnieper, with great historic and emotional significance, has in the past facilitated division of the country between competing powers. The landmass was trifurcated and in recent history till June 22, 1917, was bifurcated between Poland and Russia. From the time of Tsarist Russia, the Black Sea coast and Sevastopol have been coveted strategic assets, for trade and power projection. Through all the vagaries of time and power politics, Kyiv and the Ukrainian people remained a great bulwark of the eastern Slavic culture, as well as the centre of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The present incendiary environment between Ukraine and Russia, together with the larger players, echoes an earlier strategic crisis. While a powerless League of Nations failed to prevent World War II, today the empowered UN has been successfully emasculated by polarisation among the five permanent members of the Security Council. Attitude to Ukraine as a nation as well as a territory carries a flavour of the view on Czechoslovakia, at the height of the Sudeten crisis of 1938. The veiled threats and precipitous military developments bring back memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Viewed classically, insensitivity to Ukraine’s legitimate aspirations are a negation of the concept of the Westphalian state and international law.

Ukraine, with 77.8% Ukrainians and 17.3% people of Russian origin, even under the Soviet regime had the right to independent foreign relations and the right to maintain an independent military. Both Ukraine and Belarus were independent members of the UN. While these functions became constrained by the Soviet Constitution of 1977, Ukraine was quick to declare autonomy on July 16, 1990, as well as independence on August 24, 1991, as the Soviet Union unravelled. The present crisis must be viewed in the light of definitive protests of the Orange Revolution (2004-05) and the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv of 2014. Ukrainian consciousness, though internally split, has convincingly asserted its desire to be in control of its own future; consequently, the desire to be a member of the European Economic Union and the attempt to be a NATO member in 2008. Ukraine seeks to unshackle from Russia.

Demography and geography, however, weigh against this. To the east of the Dnieper, large sections of the Russian minority are linked to Russia. The 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula, securing of the Black Sea bases by Russia is a reality. Russia provided gas to Ukraine, which it stopped in 2015, forcing a more expensive import from Poland and Hungary. Overland pipelines from Siberia to Europe cross through Ukraine, yielding transit benefits. The flow since 2014 has been cut back and in 2020 dropped by 25%. Russia now intends to divert gas flows through Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream, further impacting Ukraine’s economy. Enveloped by Belarus and Russia on three sides, Ukraine has not been without Russian overwatch for decades. While Russia claims the violation of the Minsk agreement of 2014, it is silent on the guarantees it gave on sovereignty in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. It is at Budapest that Ukraine voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons and also undertook huge demobilisation.

Russian politico-military posturing and deployments are in tune with their strategic assertion. The conflict in Syria provided Russia with the opportunity to perfect their expeditionary capabilities as well as hone tri-services combat execution. Russia has always had the capability of bleeding Ukraine in an insurgency centred in the eastern Donbass region. Ukraine due to its voluntary massive demilitarisation and lack of military modernisation, is largely indefensible. The present overpowering deployments along the Russian and Belarus frontier, are unmatchable by Ukraine. It is a time-tested stratagem, to militarily overawe an inferior adversary and keep denying offensive intent. Using Ukraine as a fulcrum, Russia seeks leverage with Europe, NATO and the US.

Europe faces tough choices. As much as 50% of the EU gas supplies are from Russia. Some countries are 100% dependent and more significant economies like Germany and France, 50% and 25% dependent. There are no short-term alternatives to Russian gas. Most NATO members are recipients. The US spectrum of possible sanctions will have to take into consideration NATO sensibilities. Ukraine is not a NATO member. It has an inability to defend itself. The US does not have a combat in theatre presence and will not risk such a presence. Given the proximal dynamics, the Russian stance is for now on a ‘strategic high ground’.

In the recent press interview post the conference with French President Macron, President Putin has flagged the danger of Ukraine becoming a NATO member and dragging NATO into an unwanted war. He has alluded to a nuclear outcome to this future war. Russia’s assessed 4,500 nuclear warheads remain a potent reality. The 21st century, however, has a very dominant element of unpredictability. If Russia remains undeterred and escalates militarily, it will soon enough enter a dangerous terrain. All said, the US is a nuclear superpower and has an incomparable ‘intelligent’ and ‘no contact’ war-fighting capability. Resultantly, Russia may suffer unintended consequences.

The Indian embassy in Kyiv has asked Indian nationals to leave the country temporarily, while the US is relocating its embassy to the western city of Lviv. While negotiations and parleys to avoid a conflict continue, it is the new strategic paradigm that we need to appreciate. There is an overpowering convergence between Russia and China. Russia seeks its mantle of greatness. China, convinced of its own pre-eminent future, disregards all rules of international ‘business’ unless it benefits its ends and intentions. Post-world wars, international institutions are consciously targeted or disregarded. Tandem vetoes and co-positions in the UNSC have successfully stymied the UN as evident in Syria, Myanmar and Ukraine. With an untrustworthy and brooding Chinese presence along our northern borders, we need to remain conscious of this ‘strategy of impunity’, which so ideally suits the Chinese psyche as well.

There seems to be a shared learning between China and Russia. China was the first to analyse and compliment the Russian methods and operational outcomes in the Syrian war. Russia has chosen to create ‘facts on the ground’, a methodology followed by China in the South China Sea. Russia has carried out an envelopment of frontiers with respect to Ukraine with expeditious use of Belarus territory. China can be expected to use similar methods when expedient along our northern borders. Composite crisis seldom has simple outcomes. Consequences of the Ukraine crisis will cast a long shadow on international power dynamics.