Ensure no dilution of CDS’s role, charter

Gen Deepak Kapoor (retd)

Former Chief of Army Staff

After a prolonged gap of six months, it now appears that the government is making tentative moves towards announcing a new CDS. The credit for the institution of the appointment of CDS definitely goes to the present dispensation that undertook this long overdue reform three years ago. However, the delay in appointing a new CDS leaves the impression that there is a rethink on the role, leading to a possible dilution of its charter. If so, it would be a retrograde step defeating the rationale of creating the post.

There is no reason to be surprised at changes recently announced by the government in the selection criteria for appointing the new CDS. The general impression that only a Chief can be considered for the appointment of CDS is incorrect. Even at the time of Gen Rawat’s appointment as CDS, the possibility that the government could dig deeper than considering just the three service Chiefs for the task was not ruled out. After all, both the service Chiefs and the CDS being four-star ranks, it had to be logically selected from among the serving Army commander/equivalent officers.

In the past, with a few exceptions, the seniority principle was generally respected by the ruling dispensation while appointing service Chiefs. The services, being highly disciplined organisations, accepted this as a norm in consonance with their ethos. However, the present dispensation, in a departure from this practice, resorted to deeper selection. A notable instance was when while appointing Gen Rawat as the Army Chief in 2016, two officers senior to him were overlooked. Be that as it may, a systemic change in the selection process appears to have been incorporated. The recent announcement has to be viewed in this context.

However, herein lies a major dilemma. All Army commanders and equivalent-level officers of the sister services have to their credit 39-40 years of distinguished service with all of them having been cleared for promotion to successive ranks above Lt Colonel/equivalent by a stringent selection board where almost 60% get rejected every time. Statistically speaking, just 0.7% reach the rank of the Chief. Thus, all commanders who have come through this baptism of fire are equally competent. Making a choice from among these to select the CDS and Chiefs is not easy, especially if the seniority principle has to be given the go-by.

By tweaking the policy and including retired Army commanders/equivalents below 62 years of age, the government has widened the field for selection of the CDS. While this may provide it with wider choice for selection, it lays itself bare to the criticism of possible political manipulation. To keep the services apolitical is a principle which has been successfully followed most of the time since Independence.

In the seniority-conscious services, the possibility that a retired three-star officer may well be senior to some or all of the current serving Chiefs with regard to date of commissioning is strong. Hence, the inclusion of retired Army commanders and equivalents below 62 years of age in the selection process may not raise too many hackles. In any case, though ‘first among equals’, the CDS is as much a four-star officer as the service Chiefs.

The issue that should be a major concern in the interest of national security is that the right person is selected to carry forward the tasks that unfortunately could not be completed during Gen Rawat’s time. We are lagging way behind other modern nations in achieving jointness and interoperability amongst the three services. Service-centric approach and attempts at empire building/protecting needs to give way in the interest of national security and achieving optimum utilisation of scarce national resources. Atmanirbharta or self-sufficiency also has a huge role to play in this context.

Lack of a CDS for the past six months need not lead to dilution of the role and charter as was originally enshrined for the CDS at the time of creation of the post. If anything, it should be further strengthened to enable quicker implementation of envisaged reforms. Selection of the new CDS should be based on professional integrity, merit and competence to push through hurdles in the way of reforms.

In a refinement of the previous policy decision on the CDS, wherein he is mandated to be the single-point adviser to the Raksha Mantri (RM), it is suggested that instead he should be the single-point adviser to the Prime Minister who is the head of the government. The service Chiefs have as much access to the RM as the CDS, thus denuding his single-point advisory role. It would also be in greater consonance with the Kargil Review Committee recommendations (2001), which had been accepted for implementation by the government and which form the basis of creation of the post of CDS.

As a follow-up of the above principle, the operational responsibility, which is the crux of the single-point advisory role, should shift to the CDS once theatre commands are created. The theatre commanders should be reporting directly to the CDS on operational aspects. The service Chief’s charter should be revised along the lines of the US system with suitable modifications to meet our requirements.

The services, as an institution, are the last bastion for ensuring territorial integrity of the nation. They owe their allegiance to the nation and the Constitution. Their apolitical character needs to be protected in national interest. Apprehensions doing the rounds in social media of a ‘pliable’ and ‘amenable’ CDS need to be scotched. An early announcement of the new incumbent would help in curbing unnecessary speculation and rumour-mongering. It would also ensure faster implementation of the long overdue reforms in the higher defence organisation of the nation.