The night after: OBOR policy options for India

Bhartendu Kumar Singh

In the just- concluded Beijing Summit on ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, China claims to have clinched wide support for its pet project, probably the most grandiose by any great power in recent times. China’s promised $ 124 billion investments to propel OBOR notwithstanding, no definitive hypothesis can be forecasted if the initiative would be a Chinese benevolence as a rising economic Leviathan or a mercantile masterstroke out to push its case for global market, economic power and status. From an Indian perspective, however, China’s OBOR is widely perceived as war by other means that challenges its sovereignty, economy and rising profile as a great power. 

The OBOR challenge comes at a time when India is busy plotting its own growth story and needs stability and peace with its neighbours. This is more so with China with which India has a cobweb of conflictual issues. The OBOR inauguration complicates the geopolitical challenge since China would be there everywhere around India in concert with the host countries. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), for example, poses a ‘sovereign challenge’ apart from opening another front against India. Indeed, the strategic challenges posed by the CPEC warrant comprehensive research! 

In responding to Chinese OBOR, India has some constraints. First, India was late in ushering economic reforms. There is a huge gap with China on all parameters of economic performance. India does not have a rich purse for liberal investment offers to others on Chinese lines. Second, India is party to the Bangladesh - India - Myanmar - Sri Lanka - Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which is part of proposed OBOR trajectory. Thus, India cannot be seen as opposed to OBOR in toto. Third, India runs a huge trade deficit with China that will widen with blanket adoption of OBOR. In fact, the trade imbalance is heading towards a ‘looming trade war’. Fourth, OBOR has generated goodwill for China in new constituencies in Asia, Africa and even Europe at least in terms of perception. India is relatively small in geographical and economical size, and at best, can have modest goals in handling the OBOR challenge.

Internally, India needs to fast-track its own north - south and east - west connectivity. While significant progress has been achieved under the Golden Quadrilateral scheme and a new Sagarmala scheme is in action, the desirability for robust passageways remains. Imagine a train from Kanyakumari to Srinagar in 24 hours! Imagine an industrial corridor from Punjab to Bihar, Orissa generating employment all along and discouraging distress migration. There lies a problem: it takes more than 48 hours to criss cross the country from north to south or east to west since most Indian trains still run with an archival speed of 45 km per hour! 

Within South Asia (minus Pakistan), we need better connectography linking smaller neighbours in a cohesive network and pull them towards New Delhi. Imagine a series of South Asian trains running between New Delhi-Dhaka, New Delhi-Birgunj (since Kathmandu is inaccessible by rail), Mumbai-Dhaka and Dhaka-Guwahati. A similar set up of South Asian highways and waterways can be hypothesized that would engender greater communitarian bonds amongst these countries. For example, a South Asian highway passing through the backward Terai from New Delhi to Guwahati with branches to Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh would push developmental efforts in adjacent areas to new levels!  

Extended South Asia (like Afghanistan) and Southeast Asia can become extended hub for India’s economic diplomacy. Thus, in Afghanistan, India needs to continue huge investments in development of local infrastructure. In Myanmar, India can take up more road projects. Since the 21st century maritime silk route, forming part of OBOR, passes through this landmass, India would do well to match the Chinese economic diplomacy. In his book, Swedish journalist Bertil Linter (Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s most Volatile Frontier, 2016) has hypothesized the rivalry between China and India having spread to Myanmar and Indian Ocean, calling it as the ‘great game east’. China has pumped huge money in Myanmar’s development. India needs to match Chinese overtures and test Indian response to OBOR. 

China has made huge announcements at Beijing Summit towards budgetary dole outs for security, infrastructure and technology projects in participating countries. Sure, therefore, many countries in Asia and Africa would run for the Chinese money and embrace OBOR. India need not care about the OBOR bandwagon, since it (perhaps) reflects a Keynesian foreign policy towards developing countries. 

India has the potential and an opportunity to fashion its own economic initiative, albeit at a smaller level, by accelerating its partial and incomplete economic reforms as a first step. Only a prosperous, rich and economically attractive India can pull neighboring and near distance countries from slipping away into China’s gravity and facilitate its rise in a peaceful and stable manner.  

The writer is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service. His views are strictly personal