85 years of imported air force

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

No aspiring nation such as India can be counted upon in the international stage with (virtually) 100 per cent imported aerial assets of its air force. Indeed, the 21st century sovereign Indian state has to be serious and respectful to its own self to begin with. And try to eschew its hopeless and helpless dependence on foreign aircraft manufacturers which are understandably in the arms bazaar for business, profit, influence and arms twisting to maintain their geopolitical and geostrategic superiority and supremacy through high-price and fat profit. And sooner it happens, the better for Delhi. Till then, India's air force cannot expect to be a serious and powerful player, notwithstanding its impressive foreign-origin inventory. This would be applicable to all the three branches — Army, Navy, Air Force — which collectively continue to depend on critical war-fighting weapon systems (imported, instead of indigenous). India has to remember that it is the world's seventh largest land mass and second most populous country. 

Further, being the world's fourth largest air force, as the Indian Air Force celebrates 85 years on October 8, 2017, successive ruling establishments in retrospect cannot escape the retribution of history for its monumental failure to make the IAF self-reliant and self-sufficient in its war preparation in the last 70 years. It is, therefore, time for the present incumbent of the state to make urgent course-correction to transform the IAF from a fighting force with imported flying machines to an organisation with indigenous aircraft inventory. Preferably, within the next five years. Otherwise, we stare at a dim long-term future for the IAF thereof, financially, industrially and logistically.

India's import spree

Facts speak for themselves. The authoritative Military Balance 2017 (page 344-345) gives some idea about the expenditure and cost of imported military hardware pertaining to "selected arms procurements and deliveries." "182 Russian Sukhoi-30 MKI36 fighter ground attack (FGA) ordered  2000, Indian Rupees 382.7 billion or US $ 6.83 billion, it was mixture of locally built, locally assembled and Russian-built aircraft. Delivery schedule changed in 2006 to meet new completion target of 2015/2016. Production suffered significant delays and is still going on." It is the "delay" which makes things critical for the forces. It further states: "36 French Rafale fighter ground attack (FGA) ordered 2016, Euro 7.8 billion ($ 8.7 billion); 4 US Boeing P-8I Neptune anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft ordered 2016, $ 1 billion; 7 US Lockheed Martin medium transport aircraft C-130J-30 Hercules ordered 2014, $ 564.7 million; 22 US Boeing attack helicopter AH-64E Apache Guardian ordered 2015- 'contract value not known'; 15 US Boeing transport helicopter CH-47F Chinook ordered 2015- 'contract value not known'".

Military Balance 2013 too had the same story. Of import and "high price" paid by country for inability of the ruling class to make India self-sufficient in the aviation industry, thereby making a "free for all foreigners" to exact and extract Shylock-like price from the people of India. May be, the intention of Indian ruling class had always been bona fide, but that failed to convert it into a bona fide reality in the field of high-tech indigenous armament, especially aviation. Thus informed Military Balance 2013 (page 347): "8 US Boeing anti-submarine aircraft (ASW) P-8I Poseidon 2009, US $ 2.1 billion; 10 US Boeing transport aircraft C-17A Globemaster III 2011, US $ 4.1 billion."

There are instances galore of India's import spree which gives an impression of some hidden hand compelling India to bank on foreign supply at the expense of all indigenisation initiative. Else, it is impossible to comprehend as to how a country which emphasised so much on technology, education and science early, and went on to establish such institutions as IITs, IIMs, Indian Institute of Science, DRDO facilities across the country from the beginning, would fail so miserably to produce aircraft.  

What can be done now

Now, let us pause and ponder. What should be done now? Everything can be done; only by the federal government. Why? Because every nascent military aviation and major defence programme, as history shows, was initiated, supported and developed by the state. Both in the West as well as in China. Make no mistake. Aviation research, development, production and technology upgradation would require millions and billions of rupees. And no private sector corporation of the world is either going to invest in, or do charity to, a nation of 1.25 billion heads.

Though it sounds Rambo-like, India has to appoint a full-time (not part-time) Cabinet "minister of armaments and war production" to be in charge wholly and solely for defence production, thereby disconnecting him/her from other distractions for which the traditional Defence Minister of Cabinet rank would do. 

Time has run out for India as both China and Pakistan have gone too far ahead of us in indigenisation of the military aviation industry. In fact, China has already penetrated rather deep, pinching, under the guise of civil aviation, and taking advantage of dual use aviation technology from the West.                            

Another focussed action has to be on decision-making time. Although things have improved, it needs to be remembered that we live in a "danger zone" of "hostile, irrational, reckless, neighbours" who collectively understand the concept of power coming out of the barrel of the gun. Hence, quick reaction decision time is of paramount importance because technological obsolescence is moving faster than the decision-making time in certain critical sectors. Thus, China today is indigenously producing at least four air superiority fighters; two attack fighters and strategic bomber XAC H-6. All with break-neck speed. 

One, however, has to remember that aircraft production has a long gestation period and that only those willing to invest long-term research and development will succeed. India undoubtedly began early, yet it somehow lost focus and tormented between import and indigenisation lobbies. As on date, the former has the upper hand; but to make the Indian Air Force a force of substance, it has to be indigenisation. Sooner the better.

At 85, IAF certainly cannot be seen to be the torchbearer of western flying machine. That amounts to an affront to/on the civilian ruling class of India.   

The writer is an alumnus of National Defence College