Utter N-word with caution

Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd)
Defence commentator

PM Modi’s decision to launch punitive airstrikes following the JeM-organised suicide strike at Pulwama against a CRPF convoy was replete with the risk of vertical and horizontal escalation leading to more than limited war. Retribution for 40 Pulwama martyrs is one thing, but retaliation using air power, not in disputed PoK but in Pakistan, is a two step up the escalation ladder response. Under  normal circumstances, Modi may have let this option pass and settle for surgical strikes 2.0, which Pakistan  expected. But pre-election days are not normal times. With the BJP image having been dented in the Assembly elections in the three Hindi heartland states, Pulwama was a godsend to make up and show Modi as a strong leader who had made a muscular policy shift towards Pakistan. This is illusory.

Such imaginative thinking is fine, except that it has ignored the colossal intelligence failure that led to Pulwama in the first place. But when Modi revealed in one of his campaign rallies that he was ready to fire 12 missiles — even if pure fantasy — to obtain the release of Wing Commander Abhinandan, and even resort to nuclear brinkmanship by pointing that India’s nuclear arsenal was not just for Diwali, these avowals of muscularity are alarming and a good reason to regulate brazen actions of  prime ministers in less than a war situation. Amazing that the Election Commission failed to promulgate its model code to deter campaigners from using military operations to garner votes.

The US has a law called the War Powers Resolution (WPR) that was enacted in 1973 during the Vietnam War to circumscribe the President and Congress’ role in declaring war and handling less than war situations. The President must get Congress’ authority within 60 days of committing troops abroad. If the Congress denies approval, troops have to be withdrawn in 30 days. Interestingly, there are clauses in WPR that require the President to consult the Congress before armed engagement. In the US the authority of the President is frequently challenged by the Congress,  with the President having the overriding veto. The US constitution gives the President and Congress limited powers over declaring hostilities, but only the Congress can declare war. When it comes to launching missile strikes, armed drones and other punitive military actions, there are fully institutionalised procedures and a vetting chain under the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, a four-star General whom the President has to consult before any military action is cleared  by him and authorised by the President.

In India there are no constitutional and parliamentary entities that monitor, control and keep oversight over war, especially in less than war situations. That is how in 1962 Nehru authorised a deputy secretary in the MoD to order the Army to throw Chinese troops out of Thagla ridge. The Army occupying in 1987 the Wandung heights overlooking Chinese intrusion in Sumodrong Chu was local preemptive action. All major military actions are authorised by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) but without any oversight by Parliament. At best, an all-party meeting is briefed by the foreign or defence ministers. After the 2001 Parliament attack, a complete deployment of the armed forces was ordered by the CCS as integral ingredient of coercive diplomacy. The decision to declare war was widely debated in the CCS before it was rejected. Withdrawal of deployed forces after 11 months was strangely recommended by the National Security Advisory Board.

In regard to offensive punitive  action astride the LoC, one has seen it develop and escalate since 1957. Initially even exchange of small arms fire was rare. Only before the 1965 War did cross-LoC firing start and tit-for-tat raids commence. After the 1971 War, it was once again peace till the 1990 proxy war was unleashed by Pakistan. This picked up and surgical strikes were not uncommon. The cross-LoC military actions were regulated by the Northern Army Commander in Udhampur with the Army Chief in the loop.

In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the non-statutory National Security Adviser has assumed the pivotal position in the military chain of command. In the past five years of the Modi government, the country has witnessed two cross-border military operations, surgical strikes and Balakot. For each of these primary credit has been appropriated by Modi who tends to act and behave like an executive president. The highest  political leadership has only perfunctory understanding of deterrence, escalatory nature of air power, escalation control and nuclear signalling. If a dozen ballistic missiles (most severely escalatory as they are liable to be mistaken as nuclear armed) were planned to be fired and the nuclear word even conceived, it would represent nuclear brinkmanship that mature nations like India should eschew. Otherwise, it makes India look like Pakistan.

Modi by equating terrorism with national security and using it as his election winning slogan has seriously compromised both. Giving any single service chief a ‘free hand’ in planning and executing major military actions is inadvisable. A CDS must be appointed and mandated to vet trans-border operations. This will ensure that a prime minister takes a careful look at his options and is given prudent advice by the seniormost military professional, the CDS, and not guided by his confidant, the NSA, who in this instance is a police officer. This will also ensure that electoral compulsions do not shape the country’s response as war is not an option for a rising India. Phew! Balakot was good but a close one.