The Afghanistan endgame

Vivek Katju
Ex-secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

On August 21, 2017, President Trump enunciated his Afghanistan and South Asia policy. One year on, it lies in tatters. Its basic objective of bringing a semblance of normalcy to Afghanistan lies unmet. With that, beginning an end to America’s longest war remains a distant prospect. What has gone wrong?

Afghanistan’s continuing turmoil can be cumulatively attributed to many factors but the main reason is its possession of havens and sanctuaries in Pakistan. It has had unimpeded access to these secure places beyond the reach of the Afghan security forces. On its part, the US has chosen all through these years, and at the cost of over 2,500 military fatalities, not to cross the Durand Line to take out Taliban bases. It has relied on cajoling Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government. Till now, the Taliban has not shown a real willingness to do so despite some tentative attempts on its part to show a new and softer face to Afghan civilians. In fact, the Taliban has steadfastly focused on armed and terrorist action instead of efforts at peace-making.

The essential new elements in Trump’s policy were the absence of putting a timeline on troop withdrawal, publicly calling on Pakistan to close the Taliban havens or risk America’s wrath, and an open, if ungracious, signal to India to increase its economic involvement in Afghanistan. All this initially shook Pakistan for it had become used to America’s soft persuasions backed by financial assistance to bring the Taliban to the path of reconciliation. Pakistan’s concerns increased when US officials signalled that its duplicity — simultaneously sharing intelligence on the Taliban and warning them — would no longer be tolerated. It seemed not only to Pakistan, but also outside observers that Trump’s policy marked a decisive break from earlier approaches, in that it had identified that Pakistan held the key to Afghanistan’s peace and stability and its willingness to do what was necessary to make it desist from continuing to destabilise its western neighbour.

 Without making any changes on the ground, Pakistan engaged US officials to complain of terrorist attacks from the Pakistan Taliban holed up in the ungoverned areas of Afghanistan. It also softened up to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose outreach it had spurned leading to his sharp criticism of Pakistani interference in his country’s affairs. Eager to see the infrastructure of Taliban support wound up in Pakistan, the Americans initially were not taken in. This New Year’s Day, Trump tweeted, ‘The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the past 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!’ A stronger threat cannot be imagined. 

Publicly, Pakistan rejected the charges. It pointed to its cooperation in giving land and air access, military bases and intelligence cooperation. However, in order to rule out any possibility of effective American action on the ground, it privately decided to step up its engagement with the Afghanistan government. It also decided not to impede ‘behind the scenes’ contact between the Taliban and Kabul, while ensuring that the Taliban armed and terrorist actions would strongly go on. Pakistan contends that the Taliban takes its own decisions and is not under its control. It also argues that it has enjoyed wide support in Afghanistan. That it has adherents, especially among the Pashtuns, is a fact. It now has links in Iran and contacts with Russia and China, but the truth is also that without Pakistani cover it could not have became the potent force it became.

Over the past months, American officials have been in constant contact with Pakistan to ensure that the project to push the Taliban towards negotiations moves ahead. While economic pressure is being maintained through the FATF and the IMF and American links with the army are allowed to sag a bit, America has really abandoned coercion and is only seeking to persuade Pakistan. Even Trump is now mute on Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan is taking American economic garrotting in its stride. It has the Chinese and the traditional options to strengthen its foreign exchange reserves. It also knows that the possession of nuclear weapons ensures that the international community has a stake in its stability. 

An elaborate Afghanistan-Pakistan dialogue structure has been set up under the Afghan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS). The armies of the two countries are in contact, as are the intelligence agencies, both being the principal players in the bilateral equation. Acrimonious rhetoric is being shunned and claims of brotherhood are being made. The Taliban ceasefire over Eid-ul-Fitr is being proclaimed as a sign of it and Pakistan moving in the right direction. There is a possibility of another brief ceasefire on Bakr-eid. It is also being said the Taliban is showing flexibility by not insisting that the withdrawal of foreign troops is a condition precedent for peace but is now willing to allow their gradual withdrawal. The current round of terrorist attacks is being attributed to its desire to shore up its position prior to peace talks!

It is futile to think that the ongoing contacts have shored up the possibilities of peace and stability in Afghanistan. That will remain elusive even if Pakistan allows the Taliban to begin some open contacts with the Afghan authorities. Only if the US is willing to take all measures, including ground action across the Durand Line, to make Pakistan change its Afghan policy will it allow the Afghan nightmare to begin to end.