Courts must interpret statute in a way that ensures justice, not judgment

By Saurabh Malik

Law and justice are not always the same. In a set-up where a law is merely a piece of legislation till interpreted in a manner that justice flows out of it, the two can be widely divergent. A law, in fact, has the capacity to trigger unfairness, just as it can bring about righteousness, and the tilt of the regulation almost always depends upon the fashion in which it is decoded.

But one thing about the law that needs no elucidation is that the purpose behind every regulation is to provide justice and the courts must interpret the statute in a manner that the end product of all its endeavours is to balance the scales.

American politician and jurist Earl Warren, who also served as the Governor of California, said it was the spirit and not the form of law that kept justice alive. For the purpose of arriving at justice and keeping it alive, the courts need to understand a law by assuming the intent or purpose of the lawmakers who created it.

The courts need to know what the lawmakers intended and what they had in mind at the time of drafting the law to reach a correct interpretation of the statute. The approach forces the Judge to assume the role of a legal historian, who must understand the vision of the legislators at the time of deliberation and drafting of the laws.

The reader of law books here assumes a character different from others studying the books of literature. While the factor of “intention” helps a Judge in understanding the real purpose behind enacting legislation and to act accordingly, a similar approach by a literary critic exposes him to the peril of being described as one indulging in “intentional fallacy” where the intention of the author at the time of writing assumes significance.

The courts have held that jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that the court in a given case can iron out the fabric, but it cannot change its texture. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation.

But the courts must always keep in mind that every piece of legislation has an intent and a reason and achievement of that purpose is the prime object of a court dealing with law unless the legislation itself is devoid of rationale. Under the circumstances, the court needs to see whether the legislation is ultra vires of the Constitution, and act accordingly.

The basic purpose behind the interpretation of statutes, as held by the courts, is to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of the language in any particular provision.

If the intent behind enacting the law is evident from plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words, the court need not travel further in its effort to do justice.

In the state of Haryana versus Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Supreme Court held that “one of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further.

“The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity”

The Punjab and Haryana High Court only recently construed the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, to say its plain and simple reading left no manner of doubt that the Section 10-A for bringing a commission to disrepute could be invoked only by the chairman or any other member during its tenure and not thereafter.

The Bench, in its 37-page judgment, gave ample reasons behind interpreting the Act the way it has. It asserted: “…Time and again it has been held that when the language of the provisions and the intent of the legislature do not require any interpretation than the one prescribed, the court cannot rewrite the law as it would defeat the purpose of incorporating the provision while enacting an Act”.

A question that arises here is whether the legislature intended to leave in lurch a chairman who, for instance, found a day after the end of tenure that the commission he was heading has been brought to disrepute.

While it may not be possible to lay down a straitjacket formula, the courts need to ensure that the interpretation of a statute, or simply understanding it, aids in prevalence of justice even when ambiguity itself is veiled but existent in plain simple reading of words.

Wife's refusal to return home no instigation to end life

Mere refusal of a wife to return to her matrimonial home cannot be construed as instigation and does not amount to "intentional aid" to commit suicide if her husband ends life, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled.

The Bench has also ruled that an estranged wife, who tells her husband better die today if you want to end life tomorrow, would not tie the knot with trouble as such utterances do not amount to instigation. Referring to the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, the High Court has held that a person abets the doing of a thing, if he instigates any person to do that thing. A person also abets if he intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Mere refusal of a wife to return to her matrimonial home cannot be construed as instigation and does not amount to "intentional aid" to commit suicide if her husband ends life, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled.

The Bench has also ruled that an estranged wife, who tells her husband better die today if you want to end life tomorrow, would not tie the knot with trouble as such utterances do not amount to instigation. Referring to the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, the High Court has held that a person abets the doing of a thing, if he instigates any person to do that thing. A person also abets if he intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Mere refusal of a wife to return to her matrimonial home cannot be construed as instigation and does not amount to “intentional aid” to commit suicide if her husband ends life, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled.

The Bench has also ruled that an estranged wife, who tells her husband better die today if you want to end life tomorrow, would not tie the knot with trouble as such utterances do not amount to instigation. Referring to the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, the High Court has held that a person abets the doing of a thing, if he instigates any person to do that thing. A person also abets if he intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.