Nothing ‘naya’ about Pakistan

Tilak Devasher
Member, National Security Advisory Board

August 18, 2019, marked the first anniversary of Imran Khan Niazi being sworn in as Pakistan’s Prime Minister following the general election of July 25, 2018. This second consecutive democratic transition in Pakistan marked the emergence of a new party — the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) sidelining the two established parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN). Given his reputation of winning against heavy odds based on his cricketing feats and charitable activities, his swearing in was marked with great hope and expectations hyped up by his vision of a ‘naya’ Pakistan, turning Pakistan into ‘Riasat-i-Medina’ and a very ambitious 100-day programme.

One year on, Imran Khan’s reputation has taken a beating. The progress in translating the numerous promises into action has been dismal. Some of these included getting rid of corruption, building five million houses, creating 10 million jobs, establishing the rule of law, strengthening institutions and providing good governance. None of the promises look like being achieved. In reality, governance has been a casualty while institutional reforms are yet to be initiated, given Imran Khan’s one-dimensional anti-corruption agenda. What stands out instead are the U-turns or reversal of decisions, including not going to the IMF, the absurd attempt at crowd-funding a major dam, an accountability process that is increasingly perceived as being vindictive and an alibi for non-performance, curbs on the media and, above all, the failure to turn the economy around. Add to this the foreign policy dilemmas and the looming threat of the Financial Action Task Force blacklisting Pakistan in October and Imran’s cup of woes is more than full. 

The economy has clearly been the single biggest challenge for the government, especially the immediate issues of fiscal and current account deficits. Tax collection has deteriorated, foreign exchange reserves remain precarious — despite record foreign borrowings and bailouts, including from the IMF — inflation has almost doubled in one year, growth has slowed from around 5 per cent to 3.3 per cent in the year just completed and is expected to further slow down to 2.4 per cent in the current year. Then there is the massive devaluation with the rupee crashing from 120 to the dollar in July 2018 to Rs 160 in July 2019. The State Bank of Pakistan has had to double policy rates from 6.25 per cent to 13.25 per cent at present greatly increasing business costs. As a consequence, unemployment has increased and it is estimated that more than 45 lakh people have been pushed below the poverty line.

Another of Imran Khan’s problems is that he leads a fragile coalition government, with the bastion of his strength not being parliament, as it should in a democracy, but the ‘boys in khaki’. The military shadow looms large over the government euphemised as ‘being on the same page’. The army chief being part of the Prime Minister’s delegation for talks at the White House was unprecedented. So also is his being a member of the newly established Economic Development Committee. He even had a seven-hour meeting with a group of top Islamic scholars in mid-July at the GHQ to discuss madrasa reform, an area clearly in the civil government’s domain. 

Not surprising, therefore, General Bajwa’s three-year extension was expected. What was unusual was that Imran Khan himself signed the order. This was perhaps the biggest U-turn of all. Before coming to power, he had opposed extensions to the military leadership. As a result of General Bajwa’s extension, 20 Lieutenant-Generals would retire before the end of his extended term. This is bound to cause heartburn in the army. 

On the foreign policy front, the high point was Imran’s ‘working visit’ to the US and the bilateral with President Trump. From Pakistan’s perspective, the takeaway was undoubtedly the US President’s statement offering to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. To Pakistan’s discomfort, however, the State Department quickly clarified that there was no change in the US position that it was a bilateral matter. 

Imran’s worry would be that Trump, focused as he is on a US exit from Afghanistan, could revert to his earlier critical position on Pakistan, should it fail to meet two key US expectations on the Afghan peace process — a permanent ceasefire and an intra-Afghan dialogue. Most observers are convinced that it would be almost impossible for Pakistan to deliver on these two demands. Sensing victory, it is unlikely that the Taliban would listen to either Pakistan or the US. 

Imran’s greatest foreign policy challenge is, of course, India. Pakistan has been stumped with the decisive move of the Indian Government to integrate J&K, thereby demolishing the 70-year edifice of Pakistan nationalism build around ‘Kashmir banega Pakistan’. Imran’s initial reactions have been knee-jerk, making astounding statements in parliament, during public speeches and interviews. The only coherence seems to be to create war hysteria to attract international mediation to get India to reverse the changes. Since this is not going to happen, he will have to learn to live with the new reality. 

For the future, Pakistan faces enormous challenges in the domestic and foreign policy arenas requiring a serious and reasoned response. To deal with them, Imran will have to evolve and realise that the complexities of governance cannot be reduced to a simplistic formula of attacking ‘corruption’ only, as if by focusing on corruption all the other problems would go away. If he does not get his act together, his abiding image will remain of a rabble-rouser standing on a container who has the ability to fire public emotions but does not have the ability to govern.