Rigorous norms must for selecting generals

Lt-Gen KJ Singh
Former GoC-In-C, Western Command

MERIT as an overriding criterion is the current buzzword for the selection of top commanders in the armed forces. Consequently, supersession has become the norm rather than the exception, as is highlighted in the case of recent appointments of service chiefs and commanders-in-chief (Cs-in-C). Two of our current chiefs have benefited from this parameter and a similar format is being touted for the impending selection of the third one. 

While wanting to steer clear of this developing controversy, it is baffling to see orchestrated media reports trumpeting the relative merits of the prospective candidates. Merit throws up attendant complexities and consequences, which need to be resolved. Hence, there is a crying need for institutionalising the process and even defining 'merit' as it has to be legally sustainable.

Seniority vs merit

For better comprehension, important and relevant characteristics of the unique eco-system need flagging. Forces have always respected seniority. Seniors use Sir to address juniors, in deference to commissioning seniority. 

The most laudable example, quoted often, is of Lt-Gen Thakur Nathu Singh. Immediately after Independence, despite the ambiguity of different types of commissions and lack of established cadre, a very competent General refused the offer by the PM to become the first Army Chief and seconded the candidature of his senior colleague, General Cariappa. 

An equally inspiring story is of Vice-Admiral Barboza, who refused to join the MoD conspiracy in 1981 at the behest of Indira Gandhi to remove the legendary Admiral Perreira. Unfortunately, loyalty and camaraderie in top rungs is becoming extinct as evidenced in Naval C-in-C, travelling secretly in a BSF plane as a lynchpin of conspiracy to sack Admiral Bhagwat.

Decades down the line, the environment still resonates with these case studies exemplifying loyalty and betrayal. Even in the armed forces, the popular perception and desire is for the Chief being the primus inter pares with collective wisdom as the norm. 

Supersession is inevitably accompanied by motivated leaks and whispers of incompetence and other aberrations. It has a disruptive iconoclastic effect, thereby devaluing exalted appointments. In such vitiated environment, how can senior commanders command unquestioned loyalty?

The Establishment, unmindful of damages, invariably craves for suitable and flexible senior commanders, preferably without a backbone. They have persistently displayed this streak in easing out commanders like Bhagat, Harbaksh, Sinha, Hanut, Bhagwat and Joshi. Dispassionately analysing, flexible commanders cannot deliver in operations and it is against national interest to put them at the helm. We need to breed original thinkers and risk takers like Patton, Sharon and McChrystal.  

Even in our context, operations would have had a different outcome if some of our illustrious commanders had buckled during crisis. What if Harbaksh was not allowed his way, 1965 could have been another rout? Could we have liberated Bangladesh in 1971, without yielding to Manekshaw? If only political leadership had listened to Thimayya, the nation would have been spared the ignominy of 1962 debacle. Yet, ironically they were at loggerheads with politico-bureaucratic establishment.

Exclusion criteria

The process of selection for top appointments is triggered by age as a cut-off barrier, justified for tenanting viable tenures. However, the problem is the varying tenure durations specified for different services and appointments. Chiefs and important secretaries like Defence and Home have minimum two years' tenures. Original stipulations for Cs-in-C were one year in Navy, 18 months in the Air Force and two years in the Army. In a highly retrograde move, Army has reduced it to 18 months, supposedly to standardise. Why the Navy remains out of the standardisation ambit is not explained. Even worse is one year clause for Corps Commanders and Heads of Arms/Services. Ideally, the minimum tenures should be standardised to two years. To protect the current chain and minimise turbulence, it can be applied prospectively after three years. Mid-stream rotations of Cs-in-C should also be discouraged to ensure continuity.

Another deadly exclusion criterion is an open-ended vigilance guillotine, with overt and covert dimensions. An aberration in disciplinary record may allow Brigadier to become Major-General but may be misused later as a timed device even without new facts emerging. This has been further accentuated by the misuse of external agencies like the IB and the CBI. These short-term quick-fix ploys, often for motivated considerations, end up breeding risk-averse commanders and overall devaluation of senior ranks.

The solution 

The solution lies in applying rigorous selection norms backed by thorough vigilance screening and creating a pool of filtered competent senior commanders. While a 360-degree review may not be feasible, factoring peer rating as an additional input is strongly recommended. Post empanelment, seniority should be respected and supersession should be an exception. This will help keep the forces apolitical and check the tendency to cultivate godfathers. The current career progression system is heavily weighted in favour of early identification of officers with biological dividend (age advantage), followed by regimental shielding and protected career profiles in safe assignments under known commanders. 

The need is to identify such 'rising stars' early. But instead of mollycoddling, test them in challenging environment. The system should extend ownership on such officers and ruthlessly discourage regimental parochialism. This would preclude cribs that incumbent senior commanders were never groomed and given chance to serve in key assignments. We have had too many chiefs and Cs-in-C with highly skewed and peripheral profiles indicating abject system failure. There is also need to have more Cs-in-C equivalent appointments to meet cadre aspirations. The forces need to eschew centralisation and function on a genuine theatre command model. It is high time we put in place a selection system that throws up more field marshals and less controversies.