Login Register
Follow Us

India-Pak Rubicon that can’t be crossed

NEW DELHI: Any deviation from the ‘No First Use (NFU)’ policy with regard to nuclear weapons was a taboo from the time of AB Vajpayee.

Show comments

Sandeep Dikshit

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, August 16

Any deviation from the ‘No First Use (NFU)’ policy with regard to nuclear weapons was a taboo from the time of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement — India’s commitment to NFU policy is for nowbut what happens in future depends on the circumstances’’ — is the second instance in the Modi regime to add a caveat to the original policy.

Earlier, then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had drawn attention to the ambiguity in the NFU policy, but a spokesperson later clarified the minister had made the statement in his personal capacity.

Rajnath’s statement, more than signalling India’s intent to revise the policy related to the use of nuclear weapons, reflects the water that has passed under the strategic bridge in the 20 years since the policy was first formulated. At that time, not having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, therefore, not eligible to keep nuclear weapons, India had crafted a cautious policy that was meant to demonstrate that it had reluctantly acquired nuclear weapons because of threats from its two neighbours. This perception was sought to be enforced with the caveat it would adhere to NFU if any conflict broke out.

But now the international atmosphere is much more propitious for India to fine-tune its nuclear strategy to meet the two end goals — inject an element of uncertainty to deter Pakistani adventurism that the NFU policy has failed to prevent and neutralise the Pakistani counter-strategy of placing nuclear weapons on the battlefield, especially by mounting it on the short-range missile Nasr.

Doves in the Indian establishment may insist that Rajnath’s statement would make membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) difficult. This argument is a non-starter.

As things stand, China has insisted at NSG for simultaneous membership to both Pakistan and India. In such a circumstance, the Indian hint of amending its NFU policy acting as a barrier to NSG membership is meaningless because Pakistan is lower down on the responsibility scale — not only does it have a no NFU policy, it has even placed nuclear-tipped weapons close to the battlefield, indicating its inclination to use them if the conventional battlefield is tilted against it.

The entire debate over the statement revolves around two hypotheses. The first, either neighbour would be demented enough to use nuclear weapons and risk suffering an onslaught on its own territory. After all Pakistan and India are not separated by oceans and other nations like Russia and the US or North Korea and Japan. A Pakistani nuclear attack on Indian conventional forces amassed on its borders may well scorch its land and people as well.

Also,  an Indian massive retaliatory attack that follows under the NFU will also bring the scourge of radiation into the Indian territory, should any political leader be demented enough to order a strike.

The hint about a change in the NFU policy in future reflects the current dispensation’s frustration with the inability of its nuclear weapons to force a change in Pakistani behaviour. Conversely, Pakistan has been unable to counter quick silver conventional hits into its territory like the surgical strikes and Balakot bombing. If anything, this is the latest addition in the dangerous game of bluff between the two sides.

Show comments
Show comments

Top News

Most Read In 24 Hours