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Luck by chance

Sound operational planning, weapons superiority and resource support are extremely important for any army.

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Brig Vivek Lall (Retd)

Sound operational planning, weapons superiority and resource support are extremely important for any army. These are the tangible elements that indicate the probability of success in military operations. But then, there are some intangibles, difficult to list or measure, sometimes contribute to victory like luck perhaps.

I believe luck matters, and sometimes luck is the only thing that can explain what could otherwise have been a sticky end. This happened in the early years of this millennium (pre-2003 India-Pakistan declaration of ceasefire), when insurgency was peaking in J&K and trans-LoC (Line of Control) operations as well as fire assaults were the norm. 

'Fire assaults' are when either side brings down fire with heavy weapons (artillery, mortar or direct firing infantry weapons such as missiles, rockets, heavy machine guns etc.) on selected targets, with the aim to cause casualties or to communicate a message. These are not random acts of violence, but operations that require careful planning and preparation. Targets have to be carefully selected, any enemy pattern that can be exploited, or some terrain advantage that can be used. 

Preparations involve selecting points from where to fire from, movement of weapons and ammunitions, reconnaissance of targets, etc. These have to be carefully completed to ensure that surprise of action is retained. And in the area of LoC where I was deployed somewhere along the Poonch-Sunderbani road axis, we were doing all this quite well and causing heavy losses to the Pakistan army. 

Those were days when young Majors could fire any infantry weapon without referring to their Commanding Officer or bring down artillery fire by just asking. The situation was particularly tense after a 'trans-LoC operations 'by Pakistan in a neighbouring area. As a young Company Commander, my operating principle was simple - use all ingenuity to inflict maximum pain. By constantly shifting weapon positions, bringing down fire from different locations each time, aggressive firing, and random movement of own troops, we had our opponents forever guessing. In a large area we were able to stop their movement almost completely. 

It happened that despite our constant efforts to prevent routines and patterns, a foot movement from four of my posts to the Company Headquarters (HQ) became regular. This movement would take place after morning alertness drills but also made sure that soldiers would be able to reach the Battalion HQ in time for certain time-constrained administrative routines. On reaching the Company HQ, the troops would fall-in at a location we called the Jeep-Head. This was at a fair distance from Pakistani posts, at a height, and could be observed only through specialised equipment from possibly a few areas across the LoC. Transport would then move from behind its cliff cover to the 'Jeep-Head' and pick up the troops. In all probability, Pakistan observers were able to pick up the vehicle movement and maybe some soldier activity. Thereafter, common military sense and an understanding of usual drills may have led them to appreciate the target value of Jeep-Head and the best time to engage it.

Firing across the LoC, other than planned assaults, was a regular affair. Whenever this firing would start with Pakistani posts, one of my eccentricities was to be the last man to fire (force them to back-down). On one such night of firing, it seemed that the Pakistani posts did not want to back down, so we just kept firing at each other through the night. Little did we know about their morning plans!

One of our strengths in the field is our reporting systems. Every morning before first light, all soldiers would get into their alert positions and then a report would be given to the post commander and then upwards through the military hierarchy, that all was well and nothing unusual had taken place through the night. That morning, when I was given this report by my post commanders, I ordered a complete stop to all movement. Although a week day, I felt that the troops were not getting enough rest. I just took the decision without trying to weigh the pros and cons or seek any permission, which was rather unusual. And so, after the morning alert, leaving aside the usual guard duties, rest of my soldiers went to rest.

It was 6 am when my Company HQ, specifically the 'Jeep-Head' location, was suddenly hit by Pakistan army's medium artillery, missiles and rockets. They had planned well to maximise our casualties. The timing, ferocity and surprising accuracy of the attack, was such that had I not ordered 'no movement', we could have suffered many casualties. It so happened that we remained unscathed.   

So, what saved us that morning? Was it a great command style followed in my battalion which gave freedom to young company commanders, or a connect which I shared with my soldiers that made me sense the need for rest. Or was it just plain luck?

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