Chopper scam and the systemic rot

Air Marshal Brijesh Jayal (retd)
Former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Western Air Command

WITH the recent filing of a supplementary chargesheet by the Enforcement Directorate (ED), the AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter purchase scandal has again hogged the limelight. If the past is anything to go by, it is safe to assume that after a few political brownie points being scored, the issue will fade from public memory. It will be business as usual, with the case meandering its way through our interminable investigative and judicial process. Along the way, much like the Bofors episode, the case will outlive many of the personalities involved, leaving behind a defence procurement system further bruised, where defence modernisation remains a casualty and many become richer. 

The scam first hit the headlines domestically in 2013, not due to any diligence within our own defence procurement or vigilance systems, but because of the exposé overseas. A report filed by prosecutors in Italy in connection with the arrest of the chief executive officer of Finmeccanica (the parent company of AgustaWestand Helicopters), Giuseppe Orsi, had alleged that the then Indian Air Force chief was instrumental in swinging the Indian VVIP helicopter deal by tweaking technical requirements to enable the Italian helicopter to qualify in return for gratification and also named three of his relatives as intermediaries. Later, in 2018, however, the Italian appeals court in Milan had found no evidence of graft.

When the scandal came to light, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had issued a statement outlining in detail the sequence of events and facts of the case. The MoD release had also stated that “the procurement case was progressed in accordance with the established procurement procedure in a transparent manner with all stages of procurement being followed meticulously.”

However, as the unfolding of this unfortunate saga reveals, this is contrary to the facts. Had extraneous forces not intervened at the time, the EC-225 Eurocopter of France, having been found suitable for acquisition during evaluation, would have been processed through the Defence Acquisition Council in the normal course.  But, contrary to the well-established procedure, the then Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister intervened. Chairing a meeting in November 2003, he expressed concern at a single-vendor situation, questioned the IAF operational requirement of the helicopter altitude ceiling of 6,000 metres and asked for it to be lowered to 4,500 metres. He followed this with a letter to the Chief of the Air Staff. By this unconventional intervention and with both the IAF and MoD remaining mute spectators, the AgustaWestland AW-101 helicopter unexpectedly entered the race through the back door and was finally contracted for by the new government.

Having for many years worked in the Plans & Procurement section of the Air HQ, one finds it hard to believe that the entire system could so easily be manipulated, unless very powerful extraneous forces were at work. Judging by the notes and despatches of British national Christian Michel, who was extradited to India from Dubai, some of the fog surrounding this case now appears to be lifting.

That there are to be no agents dealing in weapon systems has been the mantra of the MoD for decades, yet their existence must be the worst-kept secret in New Delhi. Not only does this faceless tribe exist, but it also moves around in high circles and has access to the Capital’s elite bhawans and social circuits. The unspoken truth is that the system demonises them in public, but flirts with them in private. If the apex levels of our national security and defence management are either unaware of their existence or unable to defang them, the question that naturally follows is whether national security itself is in secure hands.

The supplementary chargesheet names Michel, the alleged middleman who is reported to have used his companies as a conduit for receiving the bribe money, and states that further investigation was going on over the role of politicians and bureaucrats involved in the case. Ever since his name first featured in the media, various reports have indicated the influence he wielded in New Delhi. 

What, however, this chargesheet reveals is that there are far graver challenges facing the national security edifice than mere monetary greed and associated criminality. Where arms lobbyists appear to have access not just to high government functionaries, but to the high security decision-making processes as well. Michel’s communications with his principals and others indicate access to the who’s who of Indian security decision-making, knowledge of plans and agenda points for the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meetings and worse, the likely positions the Cabinet members will take. Considering that the agenda for Cabinet meetings carries the highest security grading, these despatches make for frightening reading.

At a time when issues of national security are being debated in public, the revelations of Michel’s access and activities merit public attention far greater than mere corruption and criminality. The lapses amount to the selling of national security secrets and border on treason. Such lapses within the highest levels of governance cannot be left to the vagaries of our slow investigative and judicial pace of work as integrity of the system is vital for the survival of the nation. Let this be a wake-up call.