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Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)
Military commentator
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third surgical strike using Article 370 to eliminate Article 370 is the boldest of all, severing the compact with the people of J&K on insaniyat, jamhooriyat and Kashmiriyat. Article 370 was never intended to be permanent, but it should not have been scrapped without consultation with local leaders and people of the state, as 370A had stipulated. J&K has suffered a double jeopardy: it has been deprived of special status and demoted from a state to union territory, both unprecedented actions in Centre-state relations. “J&K has probably been punished,” said a shell-shocked Kashmiri. This is bound to exacerbate alienation and radicalisation in the state.
For Home Minister Amit Shah, it was a royal command performance in both Houses, correcting a historic blunder. He waxed eloquent, saying that the revocation of 370 will root out terrorism. It was reminiscent of the time demonetisation was billed to achieve the same elusive end. Shah has painted a very rosy picture of a re-structured J&K that will soon become a land of milk and honey.
The question to ask, legal issues apart, is: have the tactical and strategic consequences of these monumental changes been fully thought through, both in J&K’s external and internal domains? The optimists believe that while bringing J&K to normalcy will happen sooner than later, dealing with Pakistan will not be necessary following J&K’s full integration with the union of India.
While most analysts are linking the timing of the constitutional coup to the expected ‘reset’ in US-Pakistan relations after the Trump- Khan meeting in Washington, and fear of India-Pakistan re-hyphenation following Trump’s unilateral offer of mediation in J&K in return for Khan helping US troops’ extrication from Afghanistan, the government’s action is patently political with an eye on the Assembly elections in Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Haryana and, possibly, J&K. Still, Khan will demand from Trump his cut on Kashmir.
The bigger worry is long term. In the unlikely event of a power-sharing deal between Kabul and Taliban, where will the ‘bad Taliban’ go? Certainly not on Haj! They will be diverted eastwards, towards India and J&K. This threat contingency is not new; it has been considered for many years.
The strategic ramifications of bifurcation — hiving off from J&K, Ladakh and Kargil as union territory — will be positive. India is taking a leaf out of Pakistan’s copybook. In 1970, Islamabad separated the strategic Northern Areas from PoK and put them under direct central rule. In 2007, Northern Areas reverted to its original name of Gilgit-Baltistan, the areas through which pass various arteries of the $60-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which has become a bone of contention between China and India. In addition, Pakistan had siphoned off 5,197sq km of the Shaksgam valley in PoK to China in 1963, which Beijing says it will renounce control of, once the J&K dispute is resolved.
The lessons of Kargil were refreshed last month after its 20th year of commemoration. The Kargil-Leh road is the critical lifeline to Siachen and Ladakh. Both Kargil and Leh will now become part of the Union Territory of Ladakh, not J&K. Further, the disputed 1,800-km border in Ladakh with China will fall in Ladakh. It is in this sector that Indian troops are sandwiched between Pakistani forces in Gilgit-Baltistan and Chinese PLA in Aksai Chin. Shah clarified in Parliament that both Ladakh and Aksai Chin will be a Union Territory and PoK and Aksai Chin included in the territorial boundaries of J&K, resurrecting India's claim over Aksai Chin.
Has revising the constitutional status of J&K made it a purely domestic issue? This is questionable, given the historical record: Nehru’s letter to the UNSC on plebiscite in 1948 and its classification as a ‘dispute’ on UN Statute books. The Simla and Lahore Agreements, the 2004-07 backchannel talks and several rounds of composite dialogue on the resolution of Kashmir make talks with Pakistan necessary.
About India’s claim to PoK and Gilgit and Baltistan, the J&K state legislature had reserved 24 of the 113 seats in the House for PoK and left them vacant. That legal claim has been jettisoned after scrapping 370A. As regards the parliamentary resolution of 1994 to recover every inch of land lost to Pakistan, it will remain wishful. There is a similar resolution for the recovery of territory from China. Both Pakistan and China have reacted angrily to India’s constitutional changes. Islamabad has said changing status of J&K is illegal and violative of the UNSC Resolution on J&K. Willy-nilly, J&K will now get internationalised as never before.
Once Kashmiris come out of the lockdown — political leaders under arrest, curfew, internet, mobiles and landlines snapped and soldiers in every nook and corner — India should brace itself for a spike in violence and protests. It is likely that a new wave of fidayeen and suicide bombers will emerge, along with a more effective use of IEDs. Writing the new narrative for J&K and reaching out to the people will not be easy, even with Shah’s sop that when the situation improves, J&K will revert to statehood.
India will now manage internal and external challenges to Ladakh and J&K directly from New Delhi. This will change the security dynamics, raising tensions with Pakistan and China. What will not change is what the Kargil Review Committee report had noted 20 years ago: “The last few decades have seen J&K placing an increasing burden on the armed forces without requisite clarity about political and strategic objectives.”
‘Mission haziness’ is palpable. You can change the constitutional status of a state, but not its geography.
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