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A number of standard operating procedures (SOPs) exist.

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Vijay Mohan in Chandigarh

A number of standard operating procedures (SOPs) exist. Voluminous instruction manuals exist. Structured training regimen exists. Intelligence inputs and advisories stream in. But when incidents like the recent one in which the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) lost 40 men to a suicide car bomber at Pulwama when its convoy was moving along in the strife-torn state take place, it points towards a lapse somewhere.

A comprehensive SOP on the movement of convoys in troubled areas, which are vulnerable to attack by IEDs or gunfire, is in place. The route is sanitised by a road opening party (ROP) before a convoy is allowed to move. The ROP checks for IEDs and other hazards and maintains a dominating presence along the route. Places of halts en route are also cordoned off. Escort vehicles with armed personnel, their number depending upon the convoy’s size, are also deployed.

In the February 14 incident, an explosive-laden vehicle, moving along the same route, was rammed into a CRPF bus by a suicide bomber. According to CRPF officers, the earlier practice of closing the route for the passage of convoy was done away some time back, and civilian vehicles are allowed to pass along. This, they say, proved to be the weak link.

“It is virtually impossible to defend against such an attack, however strictly the convoy movement SOPs are followed or well armed and trained the troops are. There can simply be no inkling as to what the driver of a seemingly normal vehicle moving like regular traffic, may suddenly do,” says AS Sidhu, a former CRPF Inspector-General, who has served in Kashmir.

Some reports say that 300 kg of explosive was used in the attack. There are also reports of an intelligence input, though vague and generalised, cautioning against the use of IEDs. 

“The planning and execution of the attack shows the manpower and material used in the attack has implications, which are required to be addressed at all levels, i.e. intelligence, active combat drills on counter insurgency and area sanitisation, especially along the highways, and zeroing in on local youths who are missing and known to have joined the anti-national outfits,” says Rajeev Anand, a former para-military officer who has served in Kashmir during peak terrorism period from 1999-2000.

The CRPF, the largest armed police force of the country with 246 battalions, handles a wide range of duties covering law and order, counter-insurgency, anti-militancy and anti-Naxal operations. Close to 80 per cent of the force is deployed in militancy-affected states. According to sources, 90 battalions, about 38 per cent of the force’s executive battalions, are engaged in combating Left-wing extremism and 61 battalions (26 per cent) are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. Another 36 battalions (15 per cent) are deployed in the NorthEast. There are about 600 CRPF camps in Jammu and Kashmir.

A structured training mechanism exists in the CRPF and personnel are required to undergo various specialised courses or orientation programmes before being approved for promotion at different hierarchical levels or for being deployed for particular tasks. Personnel headed for Jammu and Kashmir go through a seven-week-long pre-induction training aimed at improving physical fitness and tactical proficiency for facing terrorism challenges in the Valley. They are also familiarised with the ever-changing modus operandi and strategy adopted by adversaries.

Rotation training of one CRPF company per battalion is a regular feature of the force for maintaining proficiency levels and updating professional skills of the jawans. Rotation training often gets hampered due to the requirement of training companies for various unforeseen law and order assignments. “Almost 98 per cent of training companies remain deployed on various short-term law and order assignments across the country. This continuous deployment of training companies affects the overall operational efficiency of the force, besides denying troops the much-wanted training and rest and recuperation,” observed a report tabled by Parliament’s Standing Committee on Home Affairs in December 2018.

The report also observed that CRPF personnel are deployed for prolonged duration in remote, inaccessible and inhospitable areas. The total peace area postings or locations are about 10 per cent only. More than 80 per cent of the CRPF personnel cannot avail of holidays and Sundays. Naturally, inadequate training and rest impacts human efficiency.

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