''India, Pak should make efforts to restart dialogue after May''

New Delhi, January 6

With US troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan imminent, what is the possible security scenario that South Asia faces? Will India and Pakistan give peace a serious chance this year? And will a second round of Trump-Kim meeting possible in the next few months lead to significant steps towards the Korean peninsular denuclearisation?  Smita Sharma spoke to Dr Moeed Yusuf, Associate Vice President at the United States Institute of Peace in DC and a Pakistani scholar, during his recent India visit. 

His latest book 'Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia' delves into brokered bargaining and third party mediation in the regional Indo-Pak nuclear crisis.

How do you assess news reports about Trump's plans of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan?

I am not surprised that the White House has denied plans to pull out half of the US troops present in Afghanistan. I don't think there was ever a cooked plan to this effect. The media hype may have taken this too far.

The so-called announcement though could have either effect: It could send a signal to the Taliban that the US interest in Afghanistan is waning and that they could thus wait the US out rather than negotiating; or the US and others trying to convince the Taliban to end the war could argue that they have publicly indicated their willingness to ultimately leave Afghanistan -- this being the principal Taliban demand -- and now Taliban need to reciprocate by stating their willingness to agree to a ceasefire to show their sincerity to the process. 

If the withdrawal happens, what will be the major impact in the region?

The conventional wisdom remains that a precipitous US withdrawal risks causing chaos in Afghanistan and undoing some of the gains achieved in the past 17 years. It may also thrust Afghanistan into a free-for-all proxy war, with regional actors jumping in to back their preferred factions. At the same time, sooner or later, a US draw down will take place. President Trump has made this clear. So the Afghan government, the US, and regional actors must work together to agree on a formula for ensuring Afghanistan's long term security. 

Do India and Pak have a serious shot at recalibrating ties post 2019 elections? Will the Pak army back peace overtures, if any, by Imran Khan? 

I will be shocked if India and Pakistan do not make serious efforts to restart some kind of dialogue after May 2019. Pakistan -- this includes the civilian and military leadership -- has made its desire to engage in a dialogue explicit and my recent discussions in India confirm that India's reluctance is largely a function of the May 2019 elections. 

Otherwise, I think both sides are clear that stalling all communication is not a viable strategy. Yes, it is another question whether they'll be able to sustain a conversation. I remain pessimistic given the mutual mistrust in the relationship and the ease with which any of the spoilers can derail the process. 

Whether nuclear capability is deterrence or not has been long debated. You have discussed the role of third party (US) mediation in Indo-Pak nuclear crisis in your new book. What is the important takeaway? 

Foremost, that the US and other strong third parties play a central role as mediators to de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan in a crisis situation.These two nuclear powers  have become more, not less, dependent on third parties to bail them out during crises since their nuclear tests. 

To be sure, this isn't to say that there was or is going to be nuclear war in South Asia sans third party mediation. But evidence is unequivocal that we haven't witnessed purely bilateral crisis management in South Asia as we did during major Cold War crises when the US and Soviet Union were at loggerheads. In some cases, India has been keener than Pakistan to use third party channels to pressure Pakistan to achieve crisis goals.

Vladimir Putin recently said the world is underestimating the probability of a nuclear war. Your views specially in the South Asian context.

The probability of deliberate nuclear launch by either side remains extremely low. Equally, I don't think either side would go out of their way to test the other's red lines. As I report in my book, I didn't pick up anything during the Kargil, 2001-02, and Mumbai 2008 crises that pointed to irrational behaviour on either side. And yet, in no nuclear environment can you ever rule out the possibility of inadvertent or accidental nuclear launch in the fog of war. This risk can't be ignored -- it exists in every nuclear environment and more so in contexts prone to crises. 

What is your take on what to expect from the next round of Trump-Kim meeting likely to be held soon on the peninsular nuclear crisis. 

The obvious benefit of the thaw between the two is that the threat of imminent war we witnessed in 2017 has disappeared. But I also don't expect immediate de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and therefore, I would predict no major breakthroughs. This is an extremely complicated equation and promises to remain so.